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Class in Metropolitan India: The Rise of the Middle Classes

Jos Mooij and Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal

It is almost a cliché to say that India’s appearance and image (internationally as well as self-image) have changed dramatically in the last fifteen years. Instead of being associated with rural poverty, India is now associated with high rates of economic growth, a booming Information Technology (IT) sector and, particularly, an increasingly expanding middle class that consumes and behaves like elites and middle classes elsewhere in the world. Considering that cities concentrate many of the defining features of the middle classes (wealth, white collar jobs, educational institutions, and shops), the middle-classization of Indian cities seems a foregone conclusion. Indeed the changing urban landscape testifies to the increasing influence of a better-off, consumerist, western oriented section of the population: malls replace small roadside shops (Voyce 2007); restaurants and multiplexes mushroom all over the city; cows, cycles and scooters progressively disappear from the roads, replaced by luxury cars (Baviskar 2007); apartment complexes multiply, communities are increasingly gated (Falzon 2004), even while slums are slowly but surely evicted towards the periphery (Dupont forthcoming). In urban India, the rich are more and more visible, the poor less and less so.​[1]​

In this chapter, we will critically examine this alleged process of middle-classization: what are the class dynamics within urban India? Is a process of middle-classization really taking place? And if so, what does this mean? As mentioned in earlier chapters, our research took place in four metropolises, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai, and it is on the basis of insights acquired in these four cities that we will try to answer these questions. We will investigate the class dynamics within urban India by focusing particularly on two domains: primary education and local democracy. Both domains have witnessed important changes in the last decades, and class dynamics have played themselves out in different ways. These case studies allow us to investigate the rise of the middle classes, and to illustrate the diverse forms that the middle-classization of Indian cities currently takes. In our analysis, we will discuss the effects of these processes of middle-classization on the provision and quality of education and democratic spaces. In so doing, we will use Hirschman’s theoretical distinction between ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ (Hirshman 1970) since this framework allows us to relate class issues (whose exit, whose voice?) to changes in the form, provision and quality of schools and local democracy.

The concept of middle-class is essentially ambiguous, and its definition is the object of a large debate among scholars working on India. One may say that just like the concept of “governance”, the concept of “middle-class” is both indispensable and risky, as it refers at the same time to an empirical reality and to an ideological project.

As an empirical reality, the middle classes are usually defined in terms of income level (Sridharan 2004) and consumption patterns (Deshpande 2006). Other, more contested criteria include the type of occupation (manual Vs non-manual), education level (English medium Vs others), place of residence (rural Vs urban), and caste/religious identity (Hindu upper castes Vs others). Depending on the criteria used, the middle classes are estimated to comprise between 6% and 26% (Sridharan 2004: 414) of the total population​[2]​. In other words, they constitute, in strictly relative terms, the elite​[3]​ .

As an ideological project, however, the middle classes are the new “moral majority” (Deshpande 2006): even though they are far from being the most numerous socio-economic category in India, they occupy a hegemonic position insofar as they represent what India wants to be in the twenty first century: educated, upwardly mobile, with a westernized consumption pattern (but not necessarily westernized values).

Yet the middle classes are more than just the rich: they are “increasingly differentiated” (Deshpande 1997: 303), and constitute an essentially open, heterogeneous, expanding category. Hence the need to distinguish, as does Fernandes, between the “new middle-classes”, i.e. the new rich – those for whom economic liberalization has meant big salaries and a completely new lifestyle - and the other middle classes: This ‘new middle class, in effect, is the social group that embodies the realizable potential of a liberalizing Indian nation’ (Fernandes 2006: 206).






 Education is a useful entry point to understand middle-classization in metropolitan India. This is so for at least two reasons. First, education is one of the mechanisms through which class reproduction takes place. As will be argued below, the existing educational system in India reflects India’s class division, and the Indian elite and middle class are comfortable with this and make active use of it. Education is a domain in which class dynamics play themselves out very visibly. Second, education is no longer something for the elite only. At present, lower income groups also regard education as one of the main avenues towards upward social mobility. In other words, many of those who do not (yet) belong to the middle class try to seek entry in this class for their children by investing in education. A study of education, hence, illustrates the agency of people who do not belong to the middle class to change that situation, and thereby, one of the dimensions of the process of middle-classization.

One of the entry points in our study on urban governance was the demand and supply of services. The importance of education can then hardly be overlooked. There is an increasing demand for education and there is also a rapidly expanding supply. Much of this comes in the form of private schools, as will be shown below.​[4]​

Education, in India, has always had important class dimensions. Initially, this was mainly a matter of access. For a long time, access was by and large restricted to the better off in Indian society. When India became independent, there was a small minority of less than twenty percent of the population and consisting mainly of upper caste men that had gone to school. The Constitution that was drafted at the time of Independence intended to put an end to this form of exclusion, In actual practice, however, not much happened for decades and education remained largely restricted to the better-offs. This situation, as Weiner (1991) argued, fitted the mind-set of the elite and middle class with their notions of social rank and hierarchy. According to this author, the Indian middle class tends to differentiate between the children of the poor and their own children: ‘between children as “hands” and children as “minds” (ibid: 188) – a distinction that clearly gives a lower status to manual activities than to intellectual ones.

From the late 1980s onwards, however, the situation changed somewhat, and universalisation of education became more prominent on the policy agenda. A major push came with the introduction of a large integrated scheme, the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), initiated in 1994, initially in a restricted number of districts (and not in metropolitan India), but expanded in the course of time. In 2001, SSA (Sarva Siksha Abhiyan, education for all) was introduced, which is implemented all over India, and focuses also on the upper primary (class 6 and 7) years of schooling. Both DPEP and SSA are, first and foremost, attempts to get all children in school. Other changes include the adoption of the 84th Constitutional Amendment in 2002, making free and compulsory education a fundamental right for children up to the age of 14. All this reflects the new and currently widespread view that education should be for all.

This, however, does not mean that education has become an equaliser in Indian society. On the contrary: the system continues to divide, although in different ways than in the past. This can be easily illustrated by referring to the extreme diversity in outcomes. On the one hand, the Indian educational system produces a highly skilled labour force that is able to find employment in the Silicon Valley on a large scale. Since the 1990s, hundreds of thousands of well-educated young Indians have left India to work in the IT sector in the United States.​[5]​ This development has even raised some concerns in developed countries about the international competitiveness of their own higher education as compared to that in India.​[6]​ On the other hand, although most children, at some point in their childhood go to school, drop-out rates are high. Only two thirds of the children who start schooling complete five years of education (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2007:39-40), and even if they do, their skills may be appallingly low. A recent report from the NGO Pratham found that almost half of the rural children in class 5 are unable to read a class 2 level text (ASER, 2006). So, while access is no longer the main mechanism that divides the privileged and the underprivileged, educational quality is.

Educational quality is directly related to the different kinds of providers that co-exist in India. The main administrative categories are government providers (educational institutes funded and managed by the government), government-aided providers (funded by the government, but privately managed – with a varying degree of government intervention), and private providers (privately managed and privately funded, mainly on the basis of fees). There is an enormous variation in educational quality offered by these different providers, and this, to a large extent, reproduces the educational divide.

In the urban landscape, the existence of these distinct providers and the increasing relative importance of private schools is even more prominent than in rural India. This is so because the high concentration of people allows for more schools per square metre, and therefore more school choice, and because aspirations of parents and children are more linked to the global, modern world, of which education is obviously a part. Figures are hard to give​[7]​ (see also chapter 7), but it has been calculated that the increased enrolment in urban India is almost completely on the account of the private sector (Kingdon, 2007). 

Private schools come in various shapes and sizes. At the top end, some very well endowed so-called international schools, with large campuses, swimming pool and other sport facilities, AC coach services to and from the school, sometimes with residential facilities, and fees of about Rs. 50,000-100,000 per year (i.e. 1000-2000 euros). These schools are for the upper classes, and children of non-resident Indians. At the other end, there are small private schools that do not charge more than Rs. 50 per month per child. The facilities of these schools are sometimes very poor. Private schools are, hence, not only for the ‘haves’. They cater also for the less wealthy segments of the population. 

The quality of the government schools is often poor, especially at primary level when other (private) schools are also available. Within the category of non-aided schools, there is a lot of variation. Some have a reputation of being very good, and attract elite and middle class children. Others are poor, like ‘normal’ government schools. One of the main differences between almost all private schools (whether low or high fee schools) and government schools is that the former are usually English-medium – or that is what they claim to be, while the latter teach in the vernacular language.

For the urban middle classes, private education is a must. Middle class families are not only willing to pay high fees, but also huge (illegal) donations to the schools of their choice, plus fees to expensive coaching centres. The latter can cost more than Rs. 35000 per year (and these centres run admission test and accept only the best students!). The benefits that these families seek are multiple. The first has to do with command over the English language. Proficiency in English is an imperative for the Indian middle class in an increasingly globalising world. This is also argued by Scrase (2004), who quotes members of the Kolkata middle class who say that “English is not only important in getting a better job, it is everywhere in social interaction. If you can’t speak it then you are a nobody” (Scrase, 2004: 1). Command over the English language has become part of middle class identity. It is ‘a form of cultural capital that serves to secure their middle class status’ (ibid: 3). Simultaneously, it sets them apart from others, since, as much as the English language unites educated Indians from different regions and cultural backgrounds and connects them with the rest of the world, it excludes those who have not been part of this educational system (Ramanathan, 1999). The second benefit that is sought is a well-paid job or admission in one of the prestigious institutions for higher education. Both are not easy to acquire. The job market is very competitive, and so is access to some of the colleges, universities or IIMs and IITs. Very good exam results and a high rank in the district or state list are necessary. The third benefit that is sought has to do with cultural capital again. As Lakha (1999: 258) argues, ‘amongst the middle class, education has now become an important requirement for a boy to find an educated partner, and for a girl to seek a professional husband’.

Many poor people in the cities also send their children to English-medium private schools. Almost all parents we talked to in the course of our study expressed the desire that their children should do better than they. In one group discussion in Hyderabad, for instance, women stated that

Education is very important for livelihood and employment, and to be independent. We are suffering. We don’t want our children to suffer. They should do better than we do. (Group discussion BS Makhta, Hyderabad 25.09.2005). 

Many of the poor parents we talked to were willing to make great financial sacrifices for the education of their children. When we casually commented to a couple (father a painter, mother not working, living in a lower class neighbourhood in Hyderabad) that they spend a lot of money on the education of their children (according to their calculation Rs. 3250 per year, for two daughters), the father replied that “if necessary, we will eat less”. This attitude is not exceptional. Coaching classes, as mentioned above, are important for the upper and middle classes, but they are also for poor people, In Delhi and Kolkata, we got the impression that virtually everybody who can afford this (even, if barely) hired private tutors. Once, in a part of old Kolkata, we had a discussion with a number of mothers living in an illegal colony next to the railway track. Men in this colony work in the unorganised sector, and many of the women work as maidservants in Salt Lake City, a middle/upper class area close by. Except one (of the five we spoke with), all were illiterate. They had learnt to write their names only through their children who had gone to school. The women told us that as maidservants they earn between Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 per month. The tuition fees vary between Rs. 100 and Rs. 200 per month per child. Ironically, the money earned by the mother is largely paid back later in the form of a tuition fee to a teenage child – again, often living in Salt Lake City! Free primary education, as the 84th educational Amendment specifies, is, hence, a bit of a misleading, perhaps even a contradictory concept. The move towards universalisation of education has come with great costs, most urgently felt by the poorest people.

But it is clear that many poor people hope that eventually their investments will pay off. In our interviews many people were reluctant to express exactly what kind of expectations they held for their children. In a group discussion in Kolkata, for instance, a group of mothers expressed that 

they want their children to continue study as much as possible. They hope their children will complete education at least up to the secondary level. After that the children will hopefully get some sort of jobs better than what they (the mothers) are doing. But the mothers are not sure about what they will get ultimately. (Group discussion, Ward 122 Kolkata 12.05.2006)

Investment in education remains a risk for lower class people. Nevertheless, many do invest, and it is probably no exaggeration to state that the educational divide is challenged intensely by millions of individuals. En masse, poor people express their desire to be included in the educational system and benefit from it. This demand is, however, not politically articulated in a critique of the system, but expressed individually, primarily as a desire to become included in the middle class. Unfortunately, however, what most lower class people succeed in achieving is inclusion in that part of the system that functions inadequately. In our research, we have come across several sad stories of parents who made considerable sacrifices for English-medium schools and tuition classes, only to find out after ten years that the level of English in the schools was so poor that their children were not only not mastering English well, but as a result also unable to pass the exams in the other subjects.

The polarization in the educational system is no coincidence. In fact, the poor quality of many schools catering to the lower classes is causally related to the existence of the other market segment, the better quality schools for the children of elite and middle class households. Hirschman’s framework is useful to explain this relationship. Well-to-do parents are often quality-conscious. They will opt to ‘exit’ when schools are not performing. They will choose another, often more costly, school that offers a better quality in their view. It can be argued that this exit may not be a bad thing. In case they ‘exit’ from a government school, it may free resources for the less well-to-do. In case of exit from a private school, it may lead to an impulse towards improving the school. In actual practice, however, this is not happening because, as Hirschman stated, the ‘exited’ schools loose those parents “who would be the most motivated and determined to put up a fight against the deterioration if they did not have the alternative of the private schools” (Hirschman, 1970: 46). It is, hence, much more likely, and the pervasive lack of accountability in the Indian government schooling system bears testimony, that their exit may lead to a further fall in quality. 

Once these parents are in the private school system, they will probably use their voice to improve the quality of education. Voice, according to Hirschman is more likely to oppose deterioration of the already fairly high quality services than of the lower quality services. Hirschman argues that this is especially the case if the density (and therefore degree of choice) of high quality services is less than that of low quality services. This is definitely the case in the Indian schooling system: the number of low quality schools (both private and government) is large, while the number of schools that are supposed to offer high quality is much less. But another relevant factor may be the investments made to get into the private schools: high fees, donations, additional tuition classes to make sure that the children pass the entry exams. All these factors create not only an entry barrier – which serves to exclude the less wealthy parts of the population – but also an exit barrier, and therefore a premium to use ‘voice’ in case of dissatisfaction. There are, hence, two different mechanisms that contribute to reinforce the polarization within the educational system. Both mechanisms are not exclusively ‘urban’, but given the much higher degree of school choice in the cities, their effects are likely to be stronger than in rural India.

To conclude, a focus on education highlights several important points about class processes in urban India. First, the differentiation within the educational system reflects processes of class differentiation and segregation. Waldrop (2004:110), in the context of urban housing observed that ‘[t]he demand among poor people to be treated as equal citizens is paralleled with the demand among the middle class for more segregation.’ This also holds for education. At the time that universal education comes within reach, the more wealthy sections of the population withdraw from the public system. Second, lower class people challenge their exclusion from the educational system on a massive scale, but, rather than as a political movement fighting for a change in the system, their demand expresses itself exclusively in individual desires towards upward mobility, and becoming part of the middle class. Third, given exit and voice strategies, the differences in quality of the various kinds of schools catering for different social classes are likely to exacerbate. 


Middle-classization and local democracy

Our second entry point into the forms and implications of the middle-classization of Indian cities is local democracy, which has been renewed in the past decade in at least two forms. First, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act (74th CAA), adopted in 1992 by the Indian Parliament and implemented by the Indian States since 1994​[8]​, has been promoting a process of democratic decentralization. Second, there is a process of increased civil society engagement in urban governance, intensified more or less in the same period. At first glance, it seems that the class dynamics that play themselves out in these two processes are quite different. The first would give voice primarily to the lower classes, through the combined effect of the system of electoral quotas imposed in the 74th CAA and the voluntary withdrawal of the elite and middle classes as voters in local elections. The second would primarily enable the elite and middle classes to influence urban governance. We will argue that this interpretation holds some truth but is also too simple. In actual practice, the two processes have some important interconnections and the middle classes dominate both spaces, although in different ways. 

To start with democratic decentralization, the 74th Amendment contains two different avenues of enhancing democratic participation: (i) a greater inclusiveness of elected municipalities, and (ii) the creation of participative structures. The legal status and effectiveness on the ground of these two avenues are very different. Greater inclusiveness is achieved by electoral quotas, through a system of reserved seats for women (one third of seats), Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (in proportion to their local demographic importance). Being mandatory, this provision had to be included in the conformity legislations adopted by the states between 1993 and 1994, and some states actually added electoral quotas for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) as well.  The establishment of new participatory structures was stimulated by the 74th CAA’s recommendation to create wards committees in all cities having a population over 300 000. This provision, meant  to increase the proximity between elected representatives and their constituents, was left to the discretion of states, and the overwhelming majority of them interpreted it in a way that ignores its inherent potential for participation: indeed, out of the four metropolises studied here, none has wards committees on the ward scale : ‘borough committees’ in Kolkata, just like ‘wards committees’ in Delhi, Mumbai and Hyderabad are actually clusters of electoral wards, concerning a population ranging from 240 000 in Mumbai to one million in Delhi, where councillors and municipal bureaucrats debate not-so-local issues, and civil society is present only in Mumbai, in the form of three NGOs selected by local councillors (see Chapter 3). 
Thus the principles of inclusion and participation have been diversely put into practice in different states and cities. The relevant question in the context of this chapter is what the impact has been on the representation and power of various social classes, and particularly on the middle classes.

The implementation of electoral quotas for women, SCs, STs (and OBCs) has doubtlessly contributed to renewing the profile of elected councillors in terms of gender and in terms of caste/community. A recent study of reservations for women in the Municipal Corporations of Chennai, Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai shows that the proportion of women among councillors had never gone beyond 9% before the implementation of the 74th Amendment, while it reached 42.5% in Kolkata local elections in 2000 (Ghosh & Tawa Lama-Rewal 2005: 103). In terms of class however, the same study, based on a survey of all women councillors and of 50% of male councillors in the four cities, suggests that a majority of councillors actually belong to the middle classes. In Delhi and Kolkata, the majority of the councillors are graduates; in Mumbai, most are educated up to Class XII; the majority of councillors know English in these three cities; the majority of male councillors run their own business, while the majority of female councillors are “housewives or social workers”, i.e. depend financially on their family; lastly, in all cities but Chennai the majority  of councillors have a monthly household income over Rs 10000 (Ghosh & Tawa Lama-Rewal 2005: 76-78)​[9]​, which situates them in the ‘expanded’ middle class, in terms of Sridharan’s classification (Sridharan 2004: 411). More data are obviously needed, both on the profile of SC and ST councillors, and on the profile of all councillors prior to the implementation of quotas, in order to get a more precise picture of the evolution of the socio-economic profile of locally elected representatives, particularly regarding the role of reservations. But the data mentioned above suggest that the increased representation of women, SCs, STs and OBCs does not necessarily translate into a lower representation of the middle classes in municipal corporations.

Yet the middle classes seem to have exited local self-government in both its welfare and procedural dimensions. On the one hand indeed, the middle classes have completely forsaken a number of those collective goods and services provided by urban local bodies, particularly primary level healthcare and primary education (See Chapters 6 and 7). On the other hand, the electoral behaviour of the middle classes is characterised by a massive abstention, which seems to be increasing over time. Here again data are hard to come by​[10]​, which points at a general lack of interest of political scientists for politics at the local level in India. But one can infer a gradual exit of the middle classes from local, urban democracy​[11]​ from the available evidence that urban residence and a higher income increasingly correlate positively with electoral abstention. Indeed (i) the level of participation in general elections has been, since 1991, consistently lower in urban than in rural constituencies (53,1% and  58,9% respectively in 2004) (Jaffrelot 2008); (ii) the voting pattern in India is characterized by the fact that the poorer, less educated sections of the population vote the most (Yadav 2000: 133); and (iii) in those local elections that took place in 2007 in Mumbai and Delhi, the highest levels of abstention were found in the richest colonies (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2007b, Zérah 2007 ).

However, as stated already at the beginning of this section, political participation can take other forms than specified in the 74th CAA  and the greater involvement of the middle classes in “associational activism”, as compared to the poor (Harriss 2007: 2719) might counterbalance their relatively low involvement in elections. Moreover new participative schemes have been set up in a number of metropolises in the last few years – such as the Swabhimana forum started in 1995 in Bangalore by the then Chief Minister, the Advanced Locality Management Scheme created in 1997 by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation, or the Bhagidari scheme launched in 2000 by the Delhi Chief minister. Indeed governments at all levels have appropriated the discourse on good governance, which gives pride of place to this kind of participation. The conception of community participation as a means towards a more effective management of local issues had been put in practice through a series of schemes as early as the 1980s in India, but these schemes were then most often confined to slum dwellers; they were part of ‘slum development’ (see Chapter 10).  What is new here is the fact that the schemes mentioned above explicitly target middle class residents, whom they invite to contribute to a more efficient management of local affairs by their active involvement. 
These new participative schemes usually rely on neighbourhood associations - variously called Road Associations, Advanced Locality Management groups (ALMs), or Resident Welfare Associations (RWAs) - as their main mobilizing structures. Even though these neighbourhood associations are limited to middle class colonies, and despite the fact that they are most often formed on the basis of self-selection and cooptation (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2007a), they have, over the past decade, acquired a legitimacy as actors of urban governance​[12]​ which can be attributed to a number of factors: (i) the new status of participation as a defining virtue of good governance; (ii) the support offered by local and state authorities; and (iii) the socio-political profile of their active members, translating into a number of resources that allow them to successfully appeal to the media and to the judiciary. Indeed the mobilization of neighbourhood associations seems today to go beyond the explicit objectives of the schemes that spurred them in the first place, and to give the middle classes a new voice in local affairs: while the ‘city’ pages of the English press in all metropolises regularly report on their demands and achievements, these associations have been important actors in major conflicts on land use, such as the one that shook Delhi in 2006. Such conflicts reveal the clout of neighbourhood associations, and suggest that they have developed avenues of political participation that are parallel to, but by no means less effective than, voting.

If we now turn to the nature of decisions taken at the municipal level, it becomes clear that the middle class interests seem to be served well. The argument most often heard (in interviews and press statements) to justify the middle classes’ massive electoral abstention is that slum dwellers, who are much more numerous, are the bank votes of politicians; and that politicians, being elected mostly by slum dwellers, neglect their other constituents. Thus neighbourhood associations have a very negative discourse on party politics, especially at the local level: they feel neglected by elected representatives, whom they consider as corrupt and inefficient
While several studies have documented the relative protection afforded by (especially local) representatives to slum dwellers (Jha, Rao, Woolcock 2005; Edelman & Mitra 2006) facing eviction threats, the percentage of municipal expenditure devoted to services that de facto cater exclusively to the poor, such as primary level healthcare and primary education, suggest that the poor are not a priority for local authorities​[13]​. In fact a number of governance reforms recently implemented by urban local bodies favour, directly or indirectly, the middle classes. Thus e-governance, adopted in Hyderabad in 1999 and more recently in Delhi, obviously benefits those citizens who have easy access to a computer. Property tax reforms, adopted in both cities, have also played a role in the increasing assertion of the middle classes on the local scene, albeit in a less straightforward way.
Property tax is the main source of income for most Municipal Corporations​[14]​, and its mode of calculation has been reformed in Hyderabad in 1999, in Delhi in 2004 and in Kolkata in 2006. In Delhi, this reform evoked strong protests by Resident Welfare Associations and the mode of calculation finally adopted did take their objections into account, which gave them a strong sense of their efficacy as a collective actor.
When the reform started being implemented, RWAs in Delhi as in Hyderabad adopted a new role in property tax collection, either spontaneously or after an agreement with local authorities. For instance, in Delhi, RWAs opened stands to explain the new calculation method to local residents; they distributed forms and helped elderly residents to fill them; in some cases they even collected filled forms and deposited them with the local Citizen Service Bureau of the Municipal Corporation. In Hyderabad, ‘RWAs were mobilised to help with explaining the new tax scheme, and in several cases at least the members of the RWAs decided collectively on their assessment’ (Kennedy 2007). Thus property tax reforms have provided RWAs with a double, major incentive to further assert their voice on the local public scene: they have realized the efficacy of their protest; and they have created a role for themselves in the collection of a major resource of local authorities. 
Some of the RWAs have gone one step further: in Hyderabad, some now exhibit on their letterhead the total amount collected from among their members as an argument supporting their importance (Kennedy 2007); others, in Delhi, are demanding that they be entrusted with managing a part of the tax thus collected to take care, by themselves, of tasks such as the maintenance of local parks, boundary walls etc. Thus RWAs have been asserting the link between representation and taxation that is so often missing in Indian politics (Mehta 2003: 139); their active role in the “fiscal relationship” (Mehta 2003: 142) of middle class residents to local authorities leads them to express heartfelt concerns with accountability (in the strictest sense of the term). 

These facts, combining with the generally negative discourse of neighbourhood associations on party politics, suggest that neighbourhood activism may lead, beyond “socio-spatial separation” (Fernandes 2007: 13)​[15]​, to some kind of political insulation. Indeed these associations can effectively compete with locally elected representatives: they act as the spokespersons of local residents, advocate their interests, contribute significantly to collecting taxes, and assert their expertise on local issues. 
Yet the year 2007 has been marked by a new engagement of neighbourhood associations with local politics, through their active involvement in the municipal elections that took place in Mumbai in February and in Delhi in April​[16]​ The observation of these two experiments shows that the relationship of the middle-classes – invoked by neighbourhood activists as their constituency – with electoral politics is more complex than their derogatory statements suggest.
In Mumbai, the torrential rains of the summer 2005 seem to have spurred the realization that even residents of rich colonies are dependant on, insofar as they have to bear the sometimes disastrous consequences of, public policies such as urban planning. Thus neighbourhood associations of even posh colonies participated actively in municipal elections, and one of the most prestigious wards of the city, Juhu, distinguished itself by selecting and supporting an independent candidate from among ALMs activists, who was finally elected as the local Corporator (Zérah 2007).
In Delhi, two federations of neighbourhood associations selected and supported 32 ‘people’s candidates’, some of whom were regularly reported upon by the English dailies. While the two initiatives differed in the profile of their members, both expressed a strong but constructive criticism of the practices characterising local elections, be it the role of money in the selection of candidates by political parties, the buying of votes through the distribution of money and goods, or the indifference of middle-class voters. ‘People’s candidates’ promised to consult local associations on a regular basis; to inform their constituents about their use of the ‘councillor’s fund’; to report every year on their achievements, and more particularly on the completion status of the works they had promised to undertake during the electoral campaign; and to step down at any time of their term if found incompetent by a majority of the voters of their ward. In other words, they advocated more transparency, more accountability and more participation in local elections (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2007b). 
It is important to note that the middle classes thus engage with local elections in a manner which is quite different from the lower classes. Using Ahuja and Chhibber’s distinction, one could say that neighbourhood associations, unlike slum associations for instance, engage with local politics not as ‘clients’ (there were few attempts at lobbying parties and their candidates), but as reformers, going one step further in the ‘civic duty’ mode described by these authors as characterising the elite’s political participation (Ahuja & Chhibber nd). 

Beyond the electoral outcome of these experiments (none of the ‘people’s candidates’ was elected in Delhi, while in Mumbai the one candidate supported by ALMs won)  the involvement of neighbourhood associations in the electoral process is significant in several respects. One, the favourable attitude of the press and their own expertise at using the media mean that these initiatives and the discourse that justified them, albeit confined to a minority of associations, were amplified and could reach a large number of people, thus increasing the possibility to re-awaken the interest of middle-class voters for local politics (Zérah 2007)​[17]​. Two, these initiatives express an attempt by neighbourhood associations to connect their own concerns to a much larger area than the neighbourhood; they reveal a tendency not to secede from local democracy, but on the contrary to use it as a platform to define public interest. Indeed a close study of the discourse of neighbourhood associations (through their press statements, their correspondence with various authorities, their public interest litigations) would doubtlessly reveal an attempt to ‘rise in generality’ (Boltanski 1990), i.e. a shift from ‘nimbyism’ to an attempt at re-defining their interests in terms of the general good​[18]​.  Three, the engagement of these associations with local elections points to the resilience of democracy as a source of legitimacy even among the middle-classes, and it is part of the ‘internal’ democratization process that these associations are currently undergoing: indeed neighbourhood associations increasingly try to conform to democratic norms and procedures (they organise secret ballot elections at regular intervals, keep minutes of their meetings and make them available to their “constituents” etc.) (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2007b). Finally, these recent experiments suggest that “new politics” – ‘a politics built up around voluntary organisations in civil society rather than political parties, around new social movements… rather than labour organizations, and … forged in communities rather than in workplaces’, according to Harriss’ definition (Harriss 2007: 2717), is not necessarily cut off from “old politics”; it points at the possibility for local democracy, notwithstanding its uneven development, to be a site of political innovation.

Coming back to Hirschman’s framework of analysis, one could say that the voice of the middle classes, through neighbourhood associations, has been recently increasing as far as urban politics is concerned, one important reason being that exit proved impossible: the Mumbai deluge in 2005, and to a lesser extent the fierce conflict between supporters of zoning and advocates of mixed land use in Delhi in 2006, showed that exit was simply not an option The many invocations of ‘the common man’, ‘ordinary citizens’, or ‘Delhi/Mumbai people’ in the middle classes’ discourse cannot hide the fact that neighbourhood associations represent, both in a descriptive and substantive sense, only a limited proportion of the population. Yet it would be an oversimplification to sum up the current situation as a case of ‘elite capture’ of democratic spaces. Here again, there is a distinction between practices and aspirations. While a focus on practices suggests that different modes of political participation are appropriated by different classes – to put it shortly, the poor vote, strike and demonstrate, while the rich lobby, petition and litigate – attention to the micro-local level of politics, which is too often “under the radar” (Fernandes 2006) of observers, points to some convergence as far as aspirations are concerned. On the one hand, the recent engagement of neighbourhood associations with local elections, and more generally their self-designation as “honest tax payers”, point at a definite frustration with their impression, however fallacious, of not being represented by elected decision-makers. On the other hand, the issue of the quality of electoral politics, and particularly the denunciation of corruption, is of prime concern to the poor, who are the worst affected by it. Indeed a recent survey of aspirations concerning democracy in India showed that ‘the “increase in corruption”… is considered the most ugly [character of democracy] with about 43% of respondents, almost equally among all classes, ranking it at the highest’ (de Souza 2007:39). In fact a few recent initiatives have had RWAs and slum dwellers jointly fight for more transparency in public decisions, particularly through the use of the new Right to Information. For instance in Delhi, in 2005, the ONG Parivartan got RWAs to join in the fight of the Right to Water Campaign, representing mostly the concerns of the poor, against a project of privatisation of the distribution of water.






In this chapter, we have tried to see behind the apparent appropriation of cities by the middle classes, and to move beyond the thesis of an elite capture of educational opportunities and democratic spaces, towards a more nuanced analysis of the class dynamics at play. As we said, both the concept of middle-class and that of middle-classization are inherently equivocal. Our two case studies show that, while practices are undoubtedly polarized along class lines, aspirations seem to converge, in any case to some extent. 
. 
Hirshman’s theoretical framework has led us to emphasize voice and exit strategies. In the case of education, the combination of exit (of the middle classes from low-quality schools) and voice (exercised by the same classes in private and often more costly schools), results in certain schools improving their quality (as defined by the parents/public) and others sliding down the quality slope. Class differentiation is, hence, not only reflected in the schooling system, but also in the quality dynamics within this system. In the case of local democratic spaces, the situation is different. Although one may say that the middle classes exit local electoral politics to some extent, we have also argued that full exit is impossible. This means that the middle classes continue to make efforts to make their voices heard, also in the electoral arena. This may lead – but we are still referring to fledging experiments – to an improvement of the quality of local electoral politics, since some of the urban middle class activism focuses on accountability. In the case of local democracy, class differentiation has, hence, not led to the same kind of institutional segregation as we have observed in the sphere of education. 




















^1	  This seems contradictory to Mike Davis’ compelling account of the ‘big bang’ of urban poverty (Davis, 2006). What we argue, however, is not so much that the proportion of poor people is decreasing, but that the city is reconstructed in such a way that they become less visible. 
^2	  Nijman (2006) also mentions the Centre for Industrial and Economic Research and the National Council for Applied Economic Research, two research centres based in Delhi, who respectively estimate that 34% and 54% of households belong to the middle class category.
^3	  The wide gap between these two figures underlines the ambiguousness of the notion of middle class in the Indian context: if we refer to the top 6% (in terms of income level) of the population,  then ‘the middle class’ is clearly a euphemism for “the wealthy”; but if we refer to the top 26%, then the lower middle classes are very much part of the picture.
^4	  Studies were undertaken by Jennifer Jalal in Delhi and Jos Mooij in Hyderabad and Kolkata. See also chapter 6 of this book. 
^5	  In the four-year period 1999-2002, more than 250.000 H-1B visa were issued to Indians. After 2001, the number came down, partly because of tighter security, but also because the further development of off-shore outsourcing (Pandit, 2004). 
^6	  See, for instance, National Centre on education and the Economy (n.d.), Tough Choices or Tough Times. The Report of the New Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce. Executive Summary downloadable from: http://www.skillscommission.org/pdf/exec_sum/ToughChoices_EXECSUM.pdf (accessed in January 2008).
^7	  This is so because unrecognised schools form a significant proportion of all private schools, but these schools are not included in the official school statistics.
^8	  The 73rd CAA, adopted at the same time, defines the rural part of that policy, often referred to as ‘panchayati raj’.
^9	  The figures are 13% in Chennai, 77% in Delhi, 61% in Kolkata and 66% in Mumbai.
^10	  The State Election Commissions created in the framework of the 73rd and 74th CAAs supervise local elections and publicize their results. Prior to the implementation of the 74th CAA, municipal elections were organized by the concerned municipal corporations, whose record keeping has been poor. It is thus extremely difficult to access data concerning municipal elections held before 1995. 
^11	  The low voting rate in municipal elections (65% in Kolkata in 2000, 43% in Mumbai and  45% in Delhi in 2002), which is always lower than for Assembly and Parliamentary elections, contrasts with the strong participation in local elections in rural India (Yadav 2000: 123).
^12	  Even in Hyderabad, where no participative scheme on the lines of Bhagidari or the ALM has been launched, RWAs have become prominent actors of urban governance.
^13	  For instance, in 2004-2005 the Municipal Corporation of Delhi devoted 2.51% of its total expenditure to “medical and public health”, 1.24% to “Mid day meal expenses” and 0.05% to “education” (these figures exclude salaries) (Srivastava 2007: 26).
^14	  In Mumbai octroi (a tax which has been abolished in the other three cities under study) is also a major source of income (Pethe 2006).
^15	  On this subject, see Dupont 2004 and Das Gupta 2007.
^16	  In Hyderabad, where municipal elections are due in 2008, Lok Satta, an NGO specialising in governance issues, has launched a “Vote Hyderabad campaign” on the lines of the “Vote Mumbai campaign”, through the internet.
^17	  The low rate of participation observed in these elections seems to contradict this point, but in Delhi at least it might be due to factors other than the middle-class’ participation, such as the ban on ration cards as an identifying document. 
^18	  For instance protests against the future route of the metro in Delhi are often justified in terms of noise pollution – i.e. a nuisance affecting not only local residents, but all passers by – even though they are spearheaded by people whose view, more than hearing, will be affected by it. 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